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Heroic policy interventions by gov-
ernment often fail, especially when 
aimed at industry self-regulation. 
Governments for the last 20 years 
have spent a great deal of time real-
izing how little governments can do 
effectively in steering toward better 
self-regulation by the industry, as well 
as the unintended consequences of 
badly constructed legal mechanisms. 
Experts have to continually advise 
in favor of independent scientific 
evidence gathering and against cor-
porate and public safety advocates’ 
claims that the sky is falling. The 
I
N  T H I S  C O L U M N ,  I explore the 
various means by which law-
yers can be helped by com-
puter scientists to stop the 
(inevitable) collateral dam-
age to innovation when the unstop-
pable force of legislation hits the 
irresistible innovation of the Inter-
net.1 I will explore some current con-
troversies (fake news, Net neutrality, 
platform regulation) from an interna-
tional perspective. The conclusion is 
familiar: lawyers and computer scien-
tists need each other to prevent a di-
sastrous retrenchment toward splin-
tered national-regional intranets. To 
avoid that, we need to be intellectu-
ally pragmatic in pursuing what may 
be a mutually disagreeable aim: mini-
mal legislative reform to achieve co-
regulation using the most indepen-
dent expert advice. The alternatives 
are to allow libertarian advocates to 
so enrage politicians that severe over-
regulation results.
Regulation should first do no 
harm. That is easy to state, difficult 
to achieve, when legislation is the 
clumsiest version of the engineering 
principle of the ‘Birmingham Screw-
driver’: to a legislator, every problem 
looks like a new bill will solve it, and 
worse, to an international lawyer ev-
ery problem looks like a new Conven-
tion or Treaty is needed. Yet in reality, 
all that law can achieve is to enforce 
against a few bad actors to prevent the 
most egregious overreaching by com-
panies and users. More negatively, the 
worst law can do is overlegislate in the 
interests of monopolies old and new 
to prevent technological progress (one 
example: a man carrying a red flag in 
front of the first motor vehicles, which 
protected stagecoaches and railways 
from innovative competition).2,a 
a United Kingdom: Locomotives Act 1865 s.3 
(An Act for farther regulating the use of Lo-
comotives on Turnpike and other roads for 
Agricultural and other purposes: 28 & 29 Vic. 
Chapter lxxxiii).
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time-limited and dynamic ‘truth’ (or 
at least second-best solution) has al-
ways lain in the expert opinion that 
was not clamoring for attention, but 
reaching those experts requires pa-
tience and focus on the part of of-
ten distracted policymakers. Twenty 
years ago, it was pornography/Nap-
ster copytheft; now it is more likely 
‘fake news’/‘Net neutrality’/‘platform 
regulation’. I will briefly sketch those 
three current controversies, as these 
case studies help us see what goes 
wrong in law enforcement and how to 
(partially) remedy that bad lawmak-
ing with good science.
Fake News
‘Fake news’ is the heartfelt cry of 
politicians who feel wronged by the 
online media. Ad blocking and filter 
bubbles have made consumers and 
voters harder to reach. Industrial 
scale behavioral profiling and viral 
marketing via Twitter bots are a new 
method to so do. The expansion of 
social networking and smartphones 
means that new methods of commu-
nication are necessary, and consum-
ers-voters are filtering out content 
they do not like. 
That is not new—it applied to the 
tabloid newspapers methods of ‘yel-
low’ journalism, radio news and tele-
graph-supplied newswires 100 years 
ago. Unfortunately, the failure to 
adopt a universal independent public 
service model then meant the public 
was inflamed by irresponsible media 
into a series of wars for the first time 
made global by the same communi-
cations means (telegraphs, railways, 
radio, long-distance reliable air and 
maritime transport) that enabled the 
mass media. Today, the calls for fake 
news regulation pay no regard to both 
historians of technology and legal 
historians who can advise on public 
service media. Twitter and Facebook 
offer parallels to Hearst newspapers 
and radio broadcasts. 
It is high time for an interdisciplin-
ary project exploring how to avoid the 
same disastrous outcomes. Computer 
technology is a tool for the powerful; 
that insight is not new but politicians 
are ignoring the previous generations 
of transformative technology and our 
attempts to marshal them. More obvi-
ously, politicians are not fully using 
the tools of behavioral insight to ex-
plore how to regulate fake news and 
social networking: evolutionary eco-
nomics and behavioral neuroscience 
tells us how we become addicted to 
social media, yet legislators are only 
beginning to consult the experts to 
explore how social networking affects 
our behavior in fundamental ways.6 
Social and economic sciences, as well 
as computer scientists, and neurosci-
entist, can help lawyers convince leg-
islators not to be silly.
Net Neutrality
Net neutrality is a simple term that 
describes the complicated reality of 
highly complex engineering task: how 
to permit sufficient permission-free 
innovation in the network. The over-
politicized doomsayers on both sides 
fail to mention what is becoming 
abundantly clear: policy can only par-
tially steer traffic management prac-
tices. Net neutrality can do no more 
than prevent large telecoms compa-
nies continuing blocking Skype and 
WhatsApp or throttling back video 
traffic their subscribers want to see. 
Net neutrality cannot stop innova-
tion by telecoms companies (whose 
own corporate histories show a some-
what checkered relationship with In-
ternet protocol network deployment). 
Regulators are simply not that com-
petent, even if they had the resources 
and will to carry out laws to the letter, 
which they do not. More scientific ex-
ploration of the limited effects of Net 
neutrality policies would be rather 
useful. An example of regulators try-
ing to do this in a non-confronta-
tional manner is the extensive work 
produced by the Body of European 
Regulators of Electronic Communica-
tions.
How can legislators discuss com-
plex laws when they do not know the 
difference between an Internet access 
provider (IAP) and an Internet service 
provider (ISP)? In European law, an 
access provider (telco) is an ‘Electron-
ic Communications Service Provider’ 
(ECSP), distinct from an Information 
Society Service Provider (ISSP). ‘Infor-
mation Society’ was Europe’s rhetori-
cal counterpoint to Al Gore’s ‘Infor-
mation Superhighway.’ Lawyers often 
fail to master these terms. 
Minimal rules made sensibly by 
technically proficient people are 
achieving quietly what millions of 
email messages to regulators and 
legislators cannot: conduct rules to 
stop telecoms companies blocking 
legitimate content while giving them 
the latitude to experiment where not 
harmful to the public Internet. Note 
that common carriage was a rather 
successful way of delivering pub-
lic (alongside private and business) 
communications services in previous 
technologies. 
Platform Regulation 
Politicians ask: What is the difference 
between platforms and networks? 
Journalists confuse their readers by 
referring to all those companies as 
ISPs—even though access networks 
perform fundamental and entirely 
different functions than social net-
works or search engines. This is the 
canard thrown into the Net neutrality 
debate by those telcos. If we are regu-
lated, they argue, the same should 
also apply to the giant monopolies of 
Google, Apple, Facebook, and Ama-
zon (known collectively as ‘GAFA’). 
The very high public profiles of Twit-
ter and Snap cause issues, as they are 
by no means monopolies. 
Google was fined €2.4billion by the 
European Commission in June 2017 
for antitrust violations because of the 
links between its search engine and 
shopping platform. Google avoided 
an adverse outcome for eight years, a 
delay even longer than Microsoft un-
der European investigation (a com-
plaint in 1998 resulted in enforce-
ment from 2004: Case T-201/04).
E-commerce dominated by the 
GAFA platforms is becoming a major 
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self-regulation. 
JANUARY 2018  |   VOL.  61  |   NO.  1   |   COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM     31
viewpoints
political issue especially in Europe, 
where mass youth unemployment 
and a rapidly ageing workforce means 
IT skills are in short supply, especially 
in Parliaments. Google- or Uber-spon-
sored promises of untold riches from 
autonomous vehicles fall on politi-
cians’ deaf ears: robots do not vote. 
This is a red flag to those advising gov-
ernments as well as those legislating.2 
If platform regulation signals a de-
sire to slow down the pace of innova-
tion by government, what rational an-
swer can be sold to government? The 
first essential is to prevent platforms 
becoming liable as publishers, by 
whatever legitimate means necessary. 
That may mean fines for failure to take 
down fake content or revenge porn. It 
may mean a user ombudsman as sug-
gested in new proposed English legis-
lation. Recruiting more internal con-
tent checkers at Facebook and Google 
to remove content may be overdue. 
Global platforms need to conform to 
European rules on hate speech (for 
instance Nazi content), a legal battle 
lost by Yahoo! in the French Tribunal 
de Grand Instance 17 years ago.b
Co-Regulation as a Hybrid Solution
What more can be done? Europe sets 
the global standards for regulation of 
content, notably in data protection 
and hate speech. The decisive power 
relationship in European law has 
swung to Germany and France. Regu-
lation will increase, and Anglo-Amer-
ican companies increasingly recog-
nize that and are embracing a French 
term: co-regulation. What that means 
is diluting government control of the 
Internet by ensuring a compromise 
based on industry self-regulation, but 
with oversight by users and by govern-
ment regulators.3 Examples include 
global Top Level domain name over-
sight. Governments have sponsored 
industry standards not only in Europe 
but globally via hosting and support-
ing the World Wide Web Consortium 
with industry. 
Co-regulation is the compromise 
computer scientists must live with. 
Totalitarian regimes want to use the 
b Confirmed in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le 
Racisme et L’antisemitisme. L’Union Des Etudi-
ants Juifs De France, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 
2006); http://bit.ly/2f8Oi59
threat of terrorism and cyber-crime 
to replace self-regulation with direct 
and often draconian control. Co-reg-
ulation is the best alternative. 
Areas for cooperation between law 
and computer science can flourish in 
co-regulatory institutions, because 
the best of them engineer a delibera-
tive evidence-driven expert-friendly 
process.5 It can curb the worst excess-
es of both corporate and government 
control. 
If lawyers and computer scien-
tists cooperate to make these social 
regulation processes work, it is the 
best chance to prevent a much worse 
system of direct government control 
emerging. 
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